On 13 March 2013, Aung San Su Kyi visited local residents again, shortly after her commission published a final report. At the same time, the villagers did not stop their protests, rather intensifying them more provokingly. She faced emotional counter words from the villagers like during her first trip 76 , but this time they became more depraved and the government responded with tight security for her. The villagers also delivered their opinion that they did not want relocation and compensation, and they were not going to stop until the project shuts down totally [Charltons, 2015. P. 4].

In November 2013, police officers and villagers clashed again in the Myanmar Wanbao’s headquarter, near the Letpadaung Project. The police used rubber bullets for antiriot shotguns, and nine police officers and five activists were wounded [Win Zaw Latt, 2013]. However, the villagers and activists still commented on environmental pollution and unfair salary for local workers, relocation and compensation processes for their land. Before the Letpadaung Investigation commission, Myanmar Wanbao reimbursed 550,000 MMKyats 77 for an acre. Later, according to the commission’s suggestion, Wanbao agreed to provide additional compensation for an acre between 700,000 and 1,25 million MMKyats [Maung Myoe, 2015. P. 38].

Back then, the author worked as a reporter, and visited the project on two times interviewing locals and activists. When he reached out to Myanmar Wanbao, they explained every detail of the Letpaduang project. The company sent journalists to meetings between villagers and company officers to examine how the company officials proposed CSR programs to local community. However, the author interviewed villagers and activists. The author asked, “If you need urgent development for your community, and, even, you know that you can produce valuable bronze from Letpaduang Mountain, what will you do?” The local activist answered that “We will not produce any copper or bronze from the Letpadaung Mountain, even we do not have anything to eat. We do not need any development if we have to destroy the Letpadaung, and we are going to enjoy its beauty until we die.” Therefore, we could clearly understand that the local residence feeling on the project.

When Myanmar Wanbao tried to start the project in December 2014, they faced vocal protests from the villagers again. Finally, the tension reached the highest point, after the police opened fire, and one villager, Daw Khin Win died on the spot. It received attention from international and local activists [Kivim"aki, 2016]. According to Amnesty’s research paper, there was preannounced lack of environmental concern and management in the mine. In May 2016, Myanmar Wanbao announced that they had started to producing copper from the Letpadaung Mine for the first time [Amnesty, 2016. P. 4].

Every Myanmar government has believed that China is the paramount partner for domestic and foreign interests [Toh Han Shih, 2014]. Until the Myanmar’s democratization period, China was the leading investor in Myanmar. However, after a series of protests in Letpadaung Copper Mine Project took place, Beijing investments dropped rapidly [Yun Sun, 2012. P. 75]. In the first year of Thein Sein’s administration, 2011-2012, Chinese FDI in Myanmar reached US$ 4345.73 78 million, and it was the second-highest amount in two countries trade since 1988, according to the Myanmar State Directorate of the Investment and Company Administration’s figures. However, in 2013-2014, FDI from China to Myanmar visibly dropped to the US$ 56.16 million, becoming the lowest since 1988 [DICA’s annual report].

In March 2016, the NLD government came into power. They continue focusing on the “China’s role in the region” and “Logic of geopolitic” when comstructing their foreign policy and Sudha Ramachandran has also illustrated symmetric idea in his work [Ramachandran, 2016]. However, the relations between the two countries have not improved as it was expected by both sides. The FDI from China never reached its highest pre 2011 point. On the other hand, the anti-Chinese sentiments are still festering in the Myanmar community.

Since 1988, Myanmar political activists had been trying to develop democracy in the country. However, they were suppressed by the Military government for over two decades, from 1988 to 2011. Therefore, majority of Myanmar people did not support the junta. They considered the government supporters and partner countries as traitors. Whenever the military government was under international pressure, China always stood by their side and supported with loans and investments [U Myo-Thit, 2017]. It has resulted in the development of the Sinophobia in Myanmar. The citizens did not trust Chinese investments because of their lack of duties for social responsibilities. Beijing understood for those sentiments and, therefore, tried to smooth every process for their investments in Myanmar with the Junta

However, the Chinese policies backfired when President Thein Sein’s government listened to their follow people’s voices. Consequently, the Beijing became concerned when the opposition was elected in the general election in 2015 [BBC, 2019]. In his trip, Wang Yi expressed hopes to his counterpart, Daw Aung San Su Kyi that Chinese interests in Myanmar will continue to be expected. The present situation of Sino-Myanmar relations, however, has many unresolved problems such the Chinese role in the Myanmar cease-fire, Myitsone Dam General Project and border issues.