What can be offered to at least ease struggle for oil and hopefully prevent new collisions? The following measures seem reasonable.

In the Persian Gulf we should strive for normalization of relations among all oil-producing states as well as between them and outside powers interested in oil. Regimes of oil transporting sealines must be strengthened.

In the Caspian subregion we need to work out a new status for the Caspian Sea, which will secure the political control of the area by the littoral states and will simultaneously allow outside capital to participate in oil exploration and excavation. Another requirement is establishment of an umbrella organization of all littoral states, which will coordinate and supervise construction of pipelines from the area to the world market.

Price policy for oil has to be determined by all oil-producing nations through existing (OPEC) and new, even broader mechanisms.

2. The Israeli-Arab conяict is another knot, which has to be untied if we really want to see lasting peace and stability in the Middle East.

Russia has been all along for a fair solution of the conяict. It must include return of occupied lands to Arab nations, creation of the Palestinian state and security guarantees for every participant of the conяict, including Israel.

Russia welcomes negotiating process at all levels and directions and is ready to serve as a peace broker and a venue for negotiations. To help the peace process all parties must be constructive, яexible and impartial.

The United States unfortunately is too much committed to support Israel. This commitment has become so much an integral part of American political culture that no US administration will sway from the pro-Israeli policies in the foreseeable future. Because of such deep-rooted commitment Washington continues to periodically succumb to Tel Aviv’s caprices and demands and to back it unreasonable positions.

There is a hope, however, that the new, more open-minded government of Israel will be forthcoming in the peace process. At the same time it is also important for other parties to make adjustments in their postures, to start accommodation with the opponents. From my personal point of view, this thesis applies, among other sides, to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3. A separate threat in the Middle East derives from the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile capabilities. Russia considers this tendency as extremely dangerous not only to the regional stability and peace, but to itself. If local states possess WMD and medium to long range missiles, they may theoretically use them against Russia. Likewise, their missiles may яy to various targets (let’s say in Europe or America) over our territory and be attacked there by other belligerent parties.

Consequently, Moscow strongly insists on total elimination and prohibition of WMD in the Middle East. We are interested as well in limiting to the lowest level possible missile capabilities of the regional actors.

It would seem reasonable to start working without any further delay on turning the entire Middle East into a zone free of all WMD. It looks like a long-term and difёcult objective but this fact only increases urgency to act.

Simultaneously enforcement of existing anti-WMD measures should be continued in a reasonable and balanced manner. Some moves in this ёeld aggravate the threats of proliferation and conяicts rather than help to soothe them.

For instance, bombings by the USA and England of Iraq in December 1998 in disregard of position of the United Nations did nothing but intensiёed tensions in the Middle East and made local governments want to have own powerful defense capabilities.

It is not helpful as well when Israeli efforts to acquire WMD and missile capabilities are overlooked. As a result Israeli antagonists may feel compelled to seek similar capabilities. Among them are Syria, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others.

Another inconsistency in the drive against WMD and missiles in the Middle East is growing export of conventional arms to this very region. The United States is the Middle East’s primary supplier, providing half of the regional arms purchases in the 1990s. Other big powers are also active. This export in itself promotes arms race, prompting local governments to constantly seek better, more sophisticated and more destructive weapons. Even worse is the fact that certain big powers are very generous with some states (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Turkey) while totally denying weapons to other states (Iran among them). Such selective approach ignites additional jealousy, distrust and fears in the region.

Presence of foreign troops in the area in its turn provides a rationale to seek WMD and missile capabilities for those countries, which have reasons to believe that the foreign might is directed against them (Iran belongs to this group of nations).

4. Contradictions among local states pose separate threats to security and stability. It is noteworthy that Iran has recently improved relations with Gulf states as well as with Iraq. It is also important to achieve reduction of tensions between Iraq and Gulf states, to bridge differences between Turkey and its neighbors. How to do it?